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Abstract. In this paper we investigate a new category of public key en-
cryption schemes which supports equality test between ciphertexts. With
this new primitive, two users, who possess their own public/private key
pairs, can issue token(s) to a proxy to authorize it to perform equality test
between their ciphertexts. We provide a formulation and a corresponding
construction for this primitive, and our formulation provides fine-grained
authorization policy enforcements for users. With the increasing popular-
ity of outsourcing data and computations to third-party service providers,
this new primitive will be an important building block in designing pri-
vacy protection solutions supporting operations on encrypted data.
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1 Introduction
Today, more andmore IT applications outsource the storage and business trans-
actions of corporate/personal database to third-party service providers. For such
applications, it is a big challenge to design mechanisms, which simultaneously
achieve the intended business objectives and provide amaximal level of privacy
guarantee on the sensitive data. Within the information security community, a
lot of research efforts have been dedicated to cryptographic techniques sup-
porting operations on encrypted data. In this paper, we are interested in Public
Key Encryption schemes which support Equality Test between ciphertexts. This
primitive is formally referred to as PKEET, and an informal functional descrip-
tion is as follows.
Given a public key encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), suppose that two
users possess their public/private key pairs (PK, SK) and (PK′, SK′) respec-
tively. If this public key encryption scheme belongs to the category of PKEET,
then the two users can authorize a third-party proxy to perform the following
test: Given Enc(M,PK) and Enc(M′,PK′) for any M and M′, test whether
M =M′ without knowing M or M′.
Asmentioned in [20], PKEET is a useful building block in construct privacy-
preserving applications, such as outsourced databases. Besides, we can foresee
more applications in the emerging computing scenarios. For example, in an
Internet-based PHR application [17], a PKEET cryptosystem can allow patients
to encrypt their attributes and a semi-trusted proxy to match the encrypted
attributes and recommend the patients to each other.
1.1 RelatedWork
The concept of PKEET cryptosystemwas proposed by Yang et al. [20]. However,
their formulation lacks an authorization mechanism for users to specify who
can perform equality test between their ciphertexts, and in fact any entity can
perform the equality test. The consequence is that standard semantic security or
IND-CPA security cannot be achieved against any entity, when considering the
fact that ciphertexts are public information. In addition, if the message space is
polynomial size or the min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower
than the security parameter, then any entity can potentially mount an offline
message recovery attack. This attack is similar to the offline keyword guessing
attack in the case of PEKS (or searchable encryption) [11,18].
The concepts of PKEET has a close nature to that of Public key encryption
with keyword search (PEKS) [8] and public key encryption with registered
keyword search (PERKS) [18]. With a PEKS or PERKS scheme, a user can enable
a server to perform equality test between the keywords embedding in a tag and
a ciphertext, and the user enforces her authorization by issuing a token to the
server. The difference is that, instead of keywords, PKEET is concerned with
the equality test of plaintexts which are encrypted under different public keys.
Another related concept is order preserving encryption (OPE) scheme, which is
a primitive firstly proposed by Agrawal et al. [1] and then further investigated
by Boldyreva et al. [6]. With an OPE scheme, the order of ciphertexts always
remains the same as that of the corresponding plaintexts. Therefore, given a
set of ciphertexts, any entity can directly compare the plaintexts. The order-
preserving property of an OPE scheme holds only for the ciphertexts generated
under the same public key, which differs from the purpose of PKEET.
1.2 Our Contribution
To mitigate the potential vulnerabilities of PKEET, we integrate a fine-grained
authorization policy enforcement mechanism into PKEET and propose an en-
hanced primitive, namely FG-PKEET. With an FG-PKEET cryptosystem, two
users, say Alice and Bob, need to run the authorization algorithm together to
issue a token to a semi-trusted proxy, which will then be authorized to perform
equality test between their ciphertexts. Without the token, the equality test can-
not be performed. With this new primitive, users gain more control over the
operations on their encrypted data.
– A user has tight control over who can perform equality test on her cipher-
texts, by choosing the semi-trusted proxies.
– A user has tight control over with whose ciphertexts that her ciphertexts
can be tested with, by choosing with which user to run the authorization
algorithm.
For FG-PKEET, we consider two types of adversaries: Type-I adversary
which represents the semi-trusted proxies, and Type-II adversary which rep-
resents all malicious entities. With respect to a Type-I adversary, we provide
OW-CCA (i.e. one-way CCA) and OW-CPA (i.e. one-way CPA) security defini-
tions; while with respect to a Type-II adversary, we provide standard IND-CCA
2
and IND-CPA security definitions. Furthermore, a fine-grained authorization
property is defined for FG-PKEET. Informally, this property means that a proxy
cannot perform equality test between two users’ ciphertexts unless it receives a
token assigned by these two users together. For example, a proxy cannot com-
pare the ciphertexts of Bob andCharlie, even if it has received a token to compare
the ciphertexts of Alice and Bob together with another token to compare the ci-
phertexts of Alice and Charlie. We propose an FG-PKEET cryptosystem, which
achieves all the security properties defined in our security model.
In the extreme situation, when the message space is polynomial size or
the min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower than the security
parameter, for FG-PKEET, only a Type-I adversary is capable of mounting an
offlinemessage recovery attackwhich is unavoidable due to the desired equality
test functionality. However, compared with the formulation in [20], where any
adversary can mount the attack, our formulation achieves a significant security
improvement. Furthermore, based on computational client puzzles [14], we
propose an enhancement to mitigate this type of attack.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the
concept of FG-PKEET. In Section 3, we propose an FG-PKEET cryptosystem. In
Section 4, we analyse the proposed cryptosystem and provide an enhancement.
In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 Formulation of FG-PKEET
In this section, we first provide a formal description for FG-PKEET, and then
present the security model.
Throughout the paper, we use “||” to denote the concatenation operator and
use x ∈R X to denote that x is chosen from X uniformly at random.
2.1 Description of FG-PKEET
AnFG-PKEETcryptosystemconsists of algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Aut,Com),
where (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) define a standard public key encryption scheme
while (Aut,Com) define the equality test functionality.
– KeyGen(`): This algorithm takes a security parameter `as input, and outputs
a public/private key pair (PK, SK). LetM denote the message space.
– Enc(M,PK): This algorithm takes a message M ∈ M and the public key PK
as input, and outputs a ciphertext C.
– Dec(C, SK): This algorithm takes a ciphertext C and the private key SK as
input, and outputs the plaintextM or an error message ⊥.
Let all the potential users be denoted asUi (1 ≤ i ≤ N), whereN is an integer,
and they adopt the above public key encryption scheme. For any i, suppose that
Ui’s key pair is denoted as (PKi, SKi). Suppose that Ui and U j want to enable
a proxy to perform equality test between their ciphertexts, the Aut and Com
algorithms are defined as follows.
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– Aut(SKi; SK j; ·): This algorithm is interactively run among Ui, U j and the
proxy, and the two users use their private keys as their secret inputs. At the
end of the algorithm execution, the proxy receives a token Ti, j as the output,
while Ui and U j receive no explicit output.
– Com(Ci,C j,Ti, j): This algorithm takes two ciphertexts Ci,C j and the token
Ti, j as input, and outputs 1 if Mi = M j or 0 otherwise. Note that Ci,C j are
two ciphertexts encrypted under PKi and PK j respectively.
In the algorithm definitions, besides the explicitly specified parameters,
other public parameters could also be specified and be implicitly part of the
input. We omit those parameters for the simplicity of description. Note that,
under our definition of Aut, Ti, j and T j,i are exactly the same thing.
It is worth noting that the Aut algorithm is supposed to run interactively
among two users and the proxy. The interactive nature of this algorithm may
seem to be a drawback, but it in fact reflects the process that the two users
together authorize the semi-trusted proxy to perform equality test between
their ciphertexts. Moreover, this algorithm only needs to be run once for any
selected proxy, which will then be able to compare all ciphertexts of the two
users. Therefore, the interactive nature of the the Aut algorithm will not be a
performance bottleneck in practice.
Similar to other cryptographic primitives, the basic requirement for FG-
PKEET is soundness. Informally, this property means that the algorithms Dec
and Com work properly with valid inputs. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 1. An FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves (unconditional) soundness if the
following two equalities hold for any i, j ≥ 1 and M,M′ ∈ M. Let (PKi, SKi) =
KeyGen(`) and (PK j, SK j) = KeyGen(`).
1. Dec(Enc(M,PKi), SKi) =M and Dec(Enc(M′,PK j), SK j) =M′.
2. Com(Enc(M,PKi),Enc(M′,PK j),Aut(SKi; SK j; ·)) is equal to 1 if M =M′, and 0
otherwise.
As a remark, in the definitions of Aut and Com, we implicitly assume that
i , j because we are only interested in testing the equality of the ciphertexts of
two different users.
2.2 The Security Model
To facilitate our formal discussions, we make the following assumptions.
1. First of all, all users honestly generate their public/private key pairs and the
execution of the Aut algorithm will be carried out through secure channels
between the involved entities.
2. Secondly, the proxies are semi-trusted (or, honest-but-curious) to the users
who have chosen them. They will faithfully follow the protocol specifica-
tions, but will try to deduce some information from the acquired data. In
addition, one proxy can serve multiple pairs of users to perform equality
test.
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3. Thirdly, there is nooverlapbetween theuser set and theproxy set, namelyno
user will be allowed to act as a proxy for another two users. This will greatly
simplify our discussion. Yet, we leave it as a future work to investigate FG-
PKEET in the case where this assumption is not true.
With respect to an FG-PKEET cryptosystem, for an honest user Ut, where
1 ≤ t ≤ N, we consider two categories of adversaries, namely Type-I and Type-II
adversaries as illustrated in Fig. 1.
1. Type-I adversary represents the semi-trusted proxies with whichUt has run
the algorithm Aut with. Referring to Fig. 1, Proxy I and Proxy L are Type-I
adversary.
2. Type-II adversary represents all possibly malicious entities in the system
from the perspective of Ut, namely Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ N, i , t). In fact, all proxies
with which Ut has not run the algorithm Aut should also be regarded as a
malicious adversary, becauseUt do not even semi-trust them. For example,
Proxy T in Fig. 1 is such an entity. However, taking them into account will
not give the Type-II adversary extra power, so that we simply ignore them.
Fig. 1. An Illustration of Adversaries for FG-PKEET
As to a Type-I adversary, it is involved in the executions of the Aut algorithm
as the proxy with Ut, and obtains the tokens, and it may also obtain some
information about Ut’s plaintexts through accessing Ut’s decryption oracle.
Clearly, in the presence of a Type-I adversary, standard indistinguishability
notions, such as IND-CCA and IND-CPA, cannot be achieved1. Against a Type-
I adversary, we consider the following two security properties.
1. OW-CCA (i.e. one-wayness under a chosen ciphertext attack), which im-
plies that an adversary cannot recover the plaintext from a ciphertext C∗t =
1 Referring to Fig. 1, given Enc(Mt,PKt), Proxy L is able to test whether Mt is equal to
any M. Since the proxy has been authorized by Ut and Uk together, to do so, it just
needs to run a test between Enc(Mt,PKt) and Enc(M,PKk).
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Enc(Mt,PKt) even if it is allowed to query the decryption oracle with any
ciphertext except for C∗t . This is the best achievable security guarantee con-
sidering the desired equality test functionality.
2. Fine-grained authorization property,whichmeans that if two users have not
authorized a proxy to perform equality test between their ciphertexts then
the proxy should not be able to do so. Referring to Fig. 1, Ut and Un have
not authorized Proxy L to perform equality test between their ciphertexts,
so that it should not be able to do so even if Ut has authorized it to perform
equality test between her ciphertexts and those of U j and Uk. It is worth
noting this is an analog to the collusion resistance property in the attribute-
based encryption schemes [15].
As to the power of a Type-II adversary, it is involved in the executions of the
Aut algorithm as the other user with Ut, so that it may learn some information
about Ut’s private key. Moreover, it may also obtain some information about
Ut’s plaintexts through accessing Ut’s decryption oracle. In the presence of a
Type-II adversary, we define the standard IND-CCA security.
Note that it is straightforward to define the CPA security by simply disal-
lowing the adversary’s access to the Dec oracle in the attack games, so that we
omit the details in this paper.
2.3 OW-CCA Security against a Type-I Adversary
Definition 2. An FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves OW-CCA security against a
Type-I adversary, if, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ N, any polynomial-time adversary has only a
negligible advantage in the attack game shown in Fig. 2, where the advantage is defined
to be Pr[M′t =Mt].
1. The challenger runs KeyGen to generate public/private key pairs (PKi,SKi) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N.
2. Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue the following types of oracle queries.
(a) Dec querywith dataC as input for the index i: the challenger returnsDec(C,SKi).
(b) Aut query with two integer indexes i, j as input: the challenger runs the Aut
algorithm with the adversary which plays the role of the proxy.
At some point, the adversary asks the challenger for a challenge for an index t.
3. Challenge phase: The challenger chooses a message Mt ∈R M and sends C
∗
t =
Enc(Mt,PKt) to the adversary.
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle queries as in
Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary’s activities should adhere to the following
restriction: The Dec oracle should not have been queried with the data C∗t for the index t.
At some point, the adversary terminates by outputting a guessM′t.
Fig. 2. The Game for OW-CCA
It is worth noting that, strictly speaking, the notion of OW-CCA is neither
weaker nor stronger than IND-CPA [3]. One one hand, an IND-CPA secure
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scheme may not be OW-CCA. For instance, many homomorphic encryption
schemes, such as Elgamal [12] and Paillier scheme [13], are IND-CPA but they
are clearly not OW-CCA. On the other hand, an OW-CCA secure scheme may
not be IND-CPA. For instance, the scheme proposed in Section 3 is OW-CCA
but it is not IND-CPA.
2.4 Fine-grained authorization property
Definition 3. An FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves the fine-grained authorization
property against a Type-I adversary, if, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ N, any polynomial-time
adversary has only a negligible advantage in the attack game shown in Fig. 3, where the
advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |.
1. The challenger runs KeyGen to generate public/private key pairs (PKi,SKi) for all
1 ≤ t ≤ N.
2. Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue the following types of oracle queries.
(a) Dec querywith dataC as input for the index i: the challenger returnsDec(C,SKi).
(b) Aut query with two integer indexes i, j as input: the challenger runs the Aut
algorithm with the adversary which plays the role of the proxy.
At some point, the adversary sends two integer indexes t,w to the challenger for
a challenge. In this phase, the Aut oracle should not have been queried with two
integer indexes t,w.
3. Challenge phase: The challenger randomly chooses two different messages M0,M1
fromM and a random bit b. If b = 0, send C∗t = Enc(M0,PKt) and C∗w = Enc(M0,PKw)
to the adversary, otherwise send C∗t = Enc(M0,PKt) and C∗w = Enc(M1,PKw).
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle queries as in
Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary’s activities should adhere to the restriction
described in Phase 1, together with the following one: The Dec oracle should not have
been queried with the data C∗t and index t or with the data C
∗
w and index w. At some point,
the adversary terminates by outputting a guess b′.
Fig. 3. The Game for the Fine-grained Authorization Property
In the attack game, it is clear that b = 0 (b = 1) implies the challenge
ciphertexts do (not) contain the same plaintext. As a result, the adversary’s
ability of determining b is equivalent to determining the equality of ciphertexts
of Ut and Uw. The adversary is not allowed to access Tt,w because we assume
the adversary is not authorized by Ut and Uw to perform the equality test.
Note the fact that a FG-PKEET cryptosystem can only achieve OW-CCA but
not IND-CPA or IND-CCA. If the adversary is allowed to choose M0,M1 in
the game, then it can trivially win the game. Therefore, different from a typical
IND (indistinguishability) security definition, where the adversary is allowed
to chooseM0,M1, in this game the challenger chooses both messages.
7
2.5 IND-CCA Security against a Type-II Adversary
Definition 4. An FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves IND-CCA security against a
Type-II adversary, if, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ N, any polynomial-time adversary has only a
negligible advantage in the attack game shown in Fig. 4, where the advantage is defined
to be |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |.
1. The challenger runs KeyGen to generate public/private key pairs (PKi,SKi) for all
1 ≤ t ≤ N.
2. Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue the following types of oracle queries.
(a) KeyRetrieve query with an integer index i as input: the challenger returns SKi
to the adversary.
(b) Dec querywith dataC as input for the index i: the challenger returnsDec(C,SKi).
(c) Aut query, defined as below.
At some point, the adversary sends an integer index t and two messages M0,M1
from M to the challenger for a challenge. In this phase, the adversary’s activities
should adhere to the following criteria.
(a) The KeyRetrieve oracle should not have been queried with the index t.
(b) For any i , t, the adversary is allowed to issue Aut oracle queries with indexes
i, t as input, for any i , t, where the adversary plays the role of Ui.
3. Challenge phase: The challenger selects b ∈R {0, 1} and sends C
∗
t = Enc(Mb,PKt) to
the adversary.
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle queries as in Phase
1. In this phase, the adversary’s activities are subject to the restrictions described in
Phase 1, together with the following one: The Dec oracle should not have been queried
with the data C∗t and index t. At some point, the adversary terminates by outputting a
guess b′.
Fig. 4. The Game for IND-CCA
In this game, the challenger generates all key pairs while the adversary is
allowed to adaptively retrieve all private keys except SKt. This formulation
faithfully describe the power of a Type-II adversary in our security model,
as defined in Section 2.2. In particular, the adversary is allowed to issue Aut
oracle queries, which reflects the fact that Ut may interactively run the Aut
algorithm with a Type-II adversary. A PKEET is IND-CCA secure against a
Type-II adversary implies that, for Ut, the execution of the Aut algorithm leaks
no information to other users.
3 A New FG-PKEET Cryptosystem
The proposed cryptosystemhas (`,G, g, p,H1, eˆ,G1,G2, g1, g2,GT, q,H2,H3) as the
global parameters which are defined as follows.
1. ` is the security parameter,G is a multiplicative group of prime order p, g is
a generator of G, and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` is a cryptographic hash function.
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2. eˆ : G1×G2 → GT is a bilinearmap,whereG1 andG2 aremultiplicative groups
of primeorder q, and theyhave g1 and g2 as their generators respectively.H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m+d1 , H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 are two cryptographic hash functions,
where m is a polynomial in `, {0, 1}m is the message space and d1 is the
bit-length of p.
Note the fact that, in a PKEET cryptosystem, a ciphertext allows the receiver
to decrypt and also allows a proxy to perform equality test. Hence, the intuition
behind our construction is to integrate some extra components into a standard
public key encryption scheme, so that these components will facilitate the equal-
ity test functionality. Specifically, in the encryption algorithm of the proposed
scheme described in next subsection, the extra components are C(2) and C(4).
3.1 The Public key Encryption Scheme
With the above global parameters defined, we first define the public key en-
cryption algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec).
– KeyGen(`): This algorithm outputs a private key SK = (x, y), where x ∈R Zp
and y ∈R Zq, and the corresponding public key is PK = (g
x, g
y
1
). Note that
the message space isM = {0, 1}m.
– Enc(M,PK): This algorithmoutputs a ciphertextC = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)),
where
u ∈R Zp, C
(1) = gu, C(3) = H2(gux) ⊕M||u, v ∈R Zq,
C(2) = gv1, C
(4) = g
vy
1
· H3(M), C(5) = H1(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M||u).
– Dec(C, SK): This algorithm first computesM′||u′ = C(3)⊕H2((C(1))x), and then
check the following
1. gu
′
= C(1),
2. H1(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′) = C(5).
If all checks pass, outputM′, otherwise output an error message ⊥.
Suppose that every user Ui, for 1 ≤ t ≤ N, adopts the above public key
encryption scheme. To facilitate our description, we use the index i for all
the variables in defining Ui’s data. For example, Ui’s key pair is denoted as
(PKi, SKi), where SK = (xi, yi) and PK = (g
xi , g
yi
1
), and Ui’s ciphertext Ci =
(C
(1)
i
,C
(2)
i
,C
(3)
i
,C
(4)
i
,C
(5)
i
) is written in the following form.
ui ∈R Zp, C
(1)
i
= gui , C
(3)
i
= H2(guixi ) ⊕Mi||ui, vi ∈R Zq,
C
(2)
i
= gvi
1
, C
(4)
i
= g
viyi
1
· H3(Mi), C(5)i = H1(C
(1)
i
||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui).
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3.2 The Token Generation Algorithm
Suppose that Ui and U j want a proxy to perform equality test between their
ciphertexts, then they run the following Aut algorithm to generate the token Ti, j
for the proxy.
– Aut(SKi, SK j, ·): This algorithm results in a token Ti, j = (g
ri, j
2
, g
yiri, j
2
, g
y jri, j
2
) for
the proxy. In more details, the token is interactively generated as follows.
1. Ui and U j generate ri, j ∈R Zq together.
2. Ui sends g
ri, j
2
, g
yiri, j
2
to the proxy, and U j sends g
y jri, j
2
to the proxy.
Note that, there can be many different ways for Ui and U j to generate ri, j
in implementing this algorithm. For instance, they can use a interactive coin
flipping protocol, such as that of Blum [5]. Or, simply they can exchanges two
nonces and set ri, j to be the hash value of them. In addition, the security prop-
erties will not be affected if U j is required to send g
ri, j
2
to the proxy.
3.3 The Equality Test Algorithm
Suppose a proxy has received the token Ti, j, then it can run the following Com
algorithm to perform equality test between the ciphetexts Ci and C j, which are
encrypted under PKi and PK j respectively.
– Com(Ci,C j,Ti, j): This algorithm outputs 1 if xi = x j or 0 otherwise, where
xi =
eˆ(C(4)
i
, g
ri, j
2 )
eˆ(C(2)
i
, g
yiri, j
2 )
=
eˆ(g
viyi
1
· H3(Mi), g
ri, j
2
)
eˆ(g
vi
1
, g
yiri, j
2
)
= eˆ(H3(Mi), g2)ri, j
x j =
eˆ(C(4)
j
, g
ri, j
2 )
eˆ(C
(2)
j
, g
y jri, j
2 )
=
eˆ(g
v jy j
1
· H3(M j), g
ri, j
2
)
eˆ(g
v j
1
, g
y jri, j
2
)
= eˆ(H3(M j), g2)ri, j
In this construction, the group G can be any multiplicative group which
holds the CDH assumption. In face, it can be set to be G1 or G2, in which case
p = q. We keep it the present way for a general construction.
In Section 2, we stated that we are only interested in testing the equality of
the ciphertexts of two different users. For the proposed cryptosystem, the token
Ti, j actually allows the proxy to perform equality test between the ciphetrexts of
Ui (and also U j). On one hand, this can be regarded as an extra functionality of
the cryptosystem. On the other hand, people may argue that this is a potential
vulnerability. We leave it as a future work to address this.
4 Comprehensive Security Analysis
In this section, we first prove that the proposed cryptosystem in Section 3
is secure in our security model. Then, we show how to improve its security
against a Type-I adversary.
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4.1 Preliminary
Following thework by Bellare andRogaway [4],we use randomoracle tomodel
hash functions in our security analysis. A function P(k) : Z → R is said to be
negligible with respect to k if, for every polynomial f (k), there exists an integer
N f such that P(k) <
1
f (k) for all k ≥ N f .
We say that the CDH (computational Diffie-Hellman) assumption holds in
G of prime order p if, given ga, gb where g is a group generator and a, b ∈R Zp,
an adversary has only a negligible advantage in computing gab.
We say that the DDH (decisional Diffie-Hellman) assumption holds inG1 of
prime order q, if an adversary has only a negligible advantage in distinguishing
(ga
1
, gb
1
, gab
1
) from (ga
1
, gb
1
, gc
1
) where g1 is a group generator and a1, b1, c1 ∈R Zq.
In the pairing setting, namely there is an efficient and non-degenerate bilinear
map eˆ : G1×G2 → GT, the DDH assumption inG1 is also referred to as the XDH
(external Diffie-Hellman) assumption [7].
In order to prove the fine-grained authorization property, we need a new
assumption, referred to as extended DBDH (decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman)
assumption. Let a pairing setting be eˆ : G1×G2 → GT, where the order of groups
is a prime q. The extended DBDH problem is formulated as follows.
1. The challenger selects g1, g4, g5 ∈R G1, and g2, g3 ∈R G2, and x1, y1, ∈R Zp,
and α, β ∈R G1. The challenger flips a coin b ∈R {0, 1} and sends Xb to the
adversary, where
X0 = (g
x1
1
, gx1
2
, gx1
4
· α, g
y1
1
, g
y1
3
, g
y1
5
· α)
X1 = (g
x1
1
, gx1
2
, gx1
4
· α, g
y1
1
, g
y1
3
, g
y1
5
· β)
2. The adversary’s outputs a guess b′. The adversary’s advantage is |Pr[b =
b′] − 12 |.
The extended DBDH problem is at most as hard as the XDH problem in a
Type-3 pairing setting [10]. In other words, if there is an algorithm to solve the
XDH problem then there must be an algorithm to solve the extended DBDH
problem, but it is not clear whether the vise-versa is true. Nonetheless, similar
to the proof of the implicit XDH assumption in [2], we can show the extended
DBDH assumption is hard in the generic group model. We leave the details to
the full paper.
4.2 Proof Results
It is straightforward to verify that the soundness property is achieved, namely
the Dec and Com work properly. We skip the details here.
Theorem 1. The proposed FG-PKEET cryptosystem is OW-CCA secure against a
Type-I adversary in the random oracle model based on the CDH assumption in G.
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Proof sketch of Theorem 1. Suppose an adversary has the advantage  in
the attack game shown in Fig. 2. The security proof is done through a sequence
of games [16].
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol execu-
tion and answers the oracle queries from the adversary, and all hash functions
are treated as random oracles. Let 0 = Pr[M
′
t =Mt]. Clearly, 0 =  holds.
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game0
except that the following. For any index i, if the adversaryqueries the decryption
oracle Dec with Ci, the challenger computesMi||ui = H2(guixi )⊕C(3)i and verifies
gui = C(1)
i
. If the verification fails, return⊥. Then, the challenger checks whether
there exists an input query C
(1)
i
||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui) to H1, which outputs C(5)i .
If such an input query exists, returnMi; otherwise return ⊥. Let the event Ent1
be that, for some Ci, a fresh input C
(1)
i
||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui to H1 results in C(5)i .
Clearly, This game is identical to Game0 unless the event Ent1 occurs. It is
straightforward that Pr[Ent1] is negligible if H1 is modeled as a random oracle.
Let 1 = Pr[M
′
t =Mt] in this game. From the Difference Lemma in [16], we have
|1 − 0| ≤ Pr[Ent1].
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game1
except that, for any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec
with Ci, the challenger does the following. Try to obtain the query to the oracle
H1 with the input C(1)i ||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui satisfying
Mi||ui = H2(guixi ) ⊕ C(3)i , g
ui = C
(1)
i
, H1(C(1)i ||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui) = C
(5)
i
.
If such a query cannot be found, return ⊥. Otherwise, return Mi. This game is
indeed identical to Game1. Let 2 = Pr[M′t =Mt], then we have 2 = 1.
Game3: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game2
except that the challenge C∗t is generated as follows.
C
(1)
t = g
ut , C
(2)
t = g
vt
1
, δ ∈R {0, 1}
m+d1 , C
(3)
t = δ,
C
(4)
t = g
vtyt
1
· H3(Mt), C(5)t = H1(C
(1)
t ||C
(2)
t ||C
(3)
t ||C
(4)
t ||Mt||ut).
This game is identical to Game2 unless the event Ent2 occurs, namely gutxt is
queried to the random oracle H2. Note that the private key xt is never used to
answer the adversary’s queries. Therefore, Pr[Ent2] is negligible based on the
CDH assumption in G. Let 3 = Pr[M
′
t = Mt] in this game. From the Difference
Lemma in [16], we have |3 − 2| ≤ Pr[Ent2].
SinceH1 andH3 aremodeled as randomoracles, it is clear that 3 is negligible.
From the above analysis, we have that  ≤ Pr[Ent1] + Pr[Ent2] + 3, which is
negligible in the random oracle model based on the CDH assumption inG. The
theorem now follows. uunionsq
Theorem 2. The proposed FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves fine-grained authoriza-
tion property against a Type-I adversary in the random oracle model based on the CDH
assumption in G and the extended DBDH assumption.
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Proof sketch of Theorem 2. Suppose an adversary has the advantage  in
the attack game shown in Fig. 3. The security proof is done through a sequence
of games [16].
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol execu-
tion and answers the oracle queries from the adversary, and all hash functions
are treated as random oracles. Let 0 = Pr[b
′ = b]. Clearly, 0 =  holds.
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game0
except that the following. For any index i, if the adversaryqueries the decryption
oracle Dec with Ci, the challenger computesMi||ui = H2(guixi )⊕C(3)i and verifies
gui = C
(1)
i
. If the verification fails, return⊥. Then, the challenger checks whether
there exists an input query C
(1)
i
||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui to H1, which outputs C(5)i . If
such an input query exists, return Mi; otherwise return ⊥. Let the event Ent1
be that, for some Ci, a fresh input C
(1)
i
||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui to H1 results in C(5)i .
Clearly, This game is identical to Game0 unless the event Ent1 occurs. it is
straightforward that Pr[Ent1] is negligible if H1 is modeled as a random oracle.
Let 1 = Pr[b
′ = b] in this game. From the Difference Lemma in [16], we have
|1 − 0| ≤ Pr[Ent1].
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game1
except that, for any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec
with Ci, the challenger does the following. Try to obtain the query to the oracle
H1 with the input C(1)i ||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui satisfying
Mi||ui = H2(guixi ) ⊕ C(3)i , g
ui = C
(1)
i
, H1(C(1)i ||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui) = C
(5)
i
.
If such a query cannot be found, return ⊥. Otherwise, return Mi. This game is
indeed identical to Game1. Let 2 = Pr[b′ = b], then we have 2 = 1.
Game3: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that as inGame2
except the following. The challenge C∗t is generated as follows.
C
(1)
t = g
ut , C
(2)
t = g
vt
1
, δt ∈R {0, 1}
m+d1 , C
(3)
t = δt,
C(4)t = g
vtyt
1
· H3(M0), C(5)t = H1(C
(1)
t ||C
(2)
t ||C
(3)
t ||C
(4)
t ||Mt||ut).
The challenge C∗w is generated as follows.
C
(1)
w = g
uw , C
(2)
w = g
vw
1
, δw ∈R {0, 1}
m+d1 , C
(3)
w = δw,
C
(4)
w = g
vwyw
1
· H3(Mb), C(5)w = H1(C
(1)
w ||C
(2)
w ||C
(3)
w ||C
(4)
w ||Mb||uw).
This game is identical to Game2 unless the event Ent2 occurs, namely gutxt
or guwxw is queried to the random oracle H2. Note that the private keys xt, xw are
never used to answer the adversary’s queries. Therefore, Pr[Ent2] is negligible
based on the CDH assumption in G. Let 3 = Pr[b
′ = b] in this game. From the
Difference Lemma in [16], we have |3 − 2| ≤ Pr[Ent2].
Game4: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that as inGame2
except for answering the Aut queries. For Ut and Uw, the challenger chooses
hi, hw ∈R Zq at the beginning of the game. On receiving an Aut query with
the inputs i, t, the challenger returns (ghir
2
, g
hiyir
2
, g
hiy jr
2
), where r ∈R Zq, and does
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something similar to answering the query with the input i,w. Let 4 = Pr[b
′ = b]
in this game. It is clear that this game is identical to Game3, therefore 4 = 3
holds.
Game5: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game4
except the following. The challenge C∗t is generated as follows.
C
(1)
t = g
ut , C
(2)
t = g
vt
1
, δt ∈R {0, 1}
m+d1 , C
(3)
t = δt,
kt ∈R Zq, C
(4)
t = g
vtytkt
1
, C
(5)
t = H1(C
(1)
t ||C
(2)
t ||C
(3)
t ||C
(4)
t ||Mt||ut).
The challenge C∗w is generated as follows.
C
(1)
w = g
uw , C
(2)
w = g
vw
1
, δw ∈R {0, 1}
m+d1 , C
(3)
w = δw,
C(4)w = g
vwywX
1
, C(5)w = H1(C
(1)
w ||C
(2)
w ||C
(3)
w ||C
(4)
w ||Mb||uw).
The value of X is set to be kt if b = 0, and otherwise kw is randomly chosen from
Zq. Let 5 = Pr[b
′ = b] in this game. It is clear that this game is identical toGame4 ,
therefore 5 = 4 holds. Let C0 = (C
∗
t ,C
∗
w) when b = 0, and C1 = (C
∗
t ,C
∗
w) when
b = 1. Distinguishing C0 and C1 is equivalent to distinguishing the following
tuples.
(g
yt
1
, gvt
1
, g
ytvtkt
1
, ght
2
, g
htyt
2
, g
yw
1
, gvw
1
, g
ywvwkt
1
, ghw
2
, g
hwyw
2
)
(g
yt
1
, gvt
1
, g
ytvtkt
1
, ght
2
, g
htyt
2
, g
yw
1
, gvw
1
, g
ywvwkw
1
, ghw
2
, g
hwyw
2
)
It is straightforward to prove that to distinguish the above tuples is equiva-
lent to distinguishing the extended DBDH tuples. Therefore, similar to proving
semantic security of ElGamal scheme [16], it is straightforward to verify that
5 −
1
2 is negligible based on the extended DBDH assumption.
From the above analysis, we have that |0−5| ≤ Pr[Ent1]+Pr[Ent2], which is
negligible in the random oracle model based on the CDH assumption in G and
the extended DBDH assumption. Note that  = |0 −
1
2 | and |5 −
1
2 | is negligible,
then  is negligible. The theorem now follows. uunionsq
Theorem 3. The proposed FG-PKEET cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure against a
Type-II adversary in the random oracle model based on the CDH assumption in G and
the DDH assumption in G1.
Proof sketch of Theorem 3. Suppose that an adversary has the advantage
 in the attack game shown in Fig. 4. The security proof is done through a
sequence of games [16].
Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol execu-
tion and answers the oracle queries from the adversary, and all hash functions
are treated as random oracles. Let 0 = Pr[b
′ = b]. Clearly, 0 =  holds.
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game0
except that the following. For any index i, if the adversaryqueries the decryption
oracle Dec with Ci, the challenger computesMi||ui = H2(guixi )⊕C(3)i and verifies
gui = C
(1)
i
. If the verification fails, return⊥. Then, the challenger checks whether
14
there exists an input query C
(1)
i
||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui) to H1, which outputs C(5)i .
If such an input query exists, returnMi; otherwise return ⊥. Let the event Ent1
be that, for some Ci, a fresh input C
(1)
i
||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui to H1 results in C(5)i .
Clearly, This game is identical to Game0 unless the event Ent1 occurs. It is
straightforward that Pr[Ent1] is negligible if H1 is modeled as a random oracle.
Let 1 = Pr[b
′ = b] in this game. From the Difference Lemma in [16], we have
|1 − 0| ≤ Pr[Ent1].
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game1
except that, for any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec
with Ci, the challenger does the following. Try to obtain the query to the oracle
H1 with the input C(1)i ||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui satisfying
Mi||ui = H2(guixi ) ⊕ C(3)i , g
ui = C
(1)
i
, H1(C(1)i ||C
(2)
i
||C
(3)
i
||C
(4)
i
||Mi||ui) = C
(5)
i
.
If such a query cannot be found, return ⊥. Otherwise, return Mi. This game is
indeed identical to Game1. Let 2 = Pr[b′ = b], then we have 2 = 1.
Game3: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game2
except that the challenge C∗t is generated as follows.
C
(1)
t = g
ut , C
(2)
t = g
vt
1
, δ ∈R {0, 1}
m+d1 , C
(3)
t = δ,
C
(4)
t = g
vtyt
1
· H3(Mb), C(5)t = H1(C
(1)
t ||C
(2)
t ||C
(3)
t ||C
(4)
t ||Mb||ut).
This game is identical to Game2 unless the event Ent2 occurs, namely gutxt is
queried to the random oracle H2. Note that the private key xt is never used to
answer the adversary’s queries. Therefore, Pr[Ent2] is negligible based on the
CDH assumption in G. Let 3 = Pr[b
′ = b] in this game. From the Difference
Lemma in [16], we have |3 − 2| ≤ Pr[Ent2].
Game4: In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game3
except that the challenge C∗t is generated as follows.
C
(1)
t = g
ut , C
(2)
t = g
vt
1
, δ ∈R {0, 1}
m+d1 , C
(3)
t = δ,
C
(4)
t = g
vtyt
1
· H3(Mb), γ ∈R {0, 1}`, C(5)t = γ.
This game is identical toGame3 unless C(1)t ||C
(2)
t ||C
(3)
t ||C
(4)
t ||Mb||ut is queried to the
random oracle H1, referred to as the event Ent3. Let 4 = Pr[b′ = b] in this game.
Based on the CDH in G, we have |4 − 3| ≤ Pr[Ent3] is negligible.
Just the same as in proving the semantic security of ElGamal scheme [16], it is
straightforward to verify that 4−
1
2 is negligible based on the DDH assumption
in G1. From the above analysis, we have that |0 − 4| ≤ Pr[Ent1] + Pr[Ent2] +
Pr[Ent3], which is negligible in the random oracle model based on the CDH
assumption in G and the DDH assumption in G1. Note that  = |0 −
1
2 | and
|4 −
1
2 | is negligible, then  is negligible. The theorem now follows. uunionsq
4.3 Potential Vulnerability and Enhancement
Note that since a Type-I adversary has access to a token Ti,t, then given a
ciphertext Enc(M,PKt) it can test whetherM′ =M holds for anyM′ by checking
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the following equality
Com(Enc(M′,PKi),Enc(M,PKt),Ti,t) = 1.
Therefore, in the extreme situation when the actual message spaceM is polyno-
mial size or the min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower than the
security parameter, for FG-PKEET, a Type-I adversary (or, semi-trusted proxies)
is capable of mounting an offline message recovery attack by checking every
M′ ∈ M.
This type of attack is unavoidable due to the desired plaintext equality test
functionality, similar to the offline keyword guessing attack in the case of PEKS
(or searchable encryption) [11,18]. However, compared with the formulation
in [20], where any adversary can mount the attack, our formulation achieves
a significant security improvement because a Type-II adversary is unable to
mount the attack. Although an offline message recovery attack is theoretically
unavoidable in the presence of a Type-I adversary, but, depending on the specific
cryptosystem, certain countermeasure can be employed to mitigate such an
attack. One possible countermeasure is shown as below.
As in the original cryptosystem proposed in Section 3, the enhanced cryp-
tosystem requires the same global parameters, namely
(`,G, g, p,H1, eˆ,G1,G2, g1, g2,GT, q,H2,H3).
In addition, Q · T, a puzzle hardness parameter L (detailed below), and a hash
functionUH : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗
Q·T
are also published,whereQ,T are two large primes.
These additional parameters are required by the computational client puzzle
scheme [14], which is employed because it is deterministic and immune to
parallel attacks [19]. Note that the generation of Q · T could be bootstrapped by
a party trusted by all users in the system, and threshold techniques (e.g. [9])
can be used to improve the security. Nevertheless, this trust assumption is not
required for achieving the existing security properties.
The algorithm KeyGen is identical to that in the original scheme, while the
algorithms Enc and Dec are redefined as follows.
– Enc(M,PK): This algorithmoutputs a ciphertextC = (C(1),C(2),C(3),C(4),C(5)),
where
u ∈R Zp, C
(1) = gu, C(3) = H2(gux) ⊕M||u, v ∈R Zq, C(2) = gv1,
C(4) = g
vy
1
· H3((UH(M))2
L
mod Q · T)), C(5) = H1(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M||u).
– Dec(C, SK): This algorithm first computesM′||u′ = C(3)⊕H2((C(1))x), and then
check the following
1. gu
′
= C(1),
2. H1(C(1)||C(2)||C(3)||C(4)||M′||u′) = C(5).
If all checks pass, outputM′, otherwise output an error message ⊥.
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Comparedwith the original encryption and decryption algorithms, themain
difference is in computing C(4), where the encryptor needs to perform L multi-
plications in Z∗
Q·T
in order to compute (UH(M))2L mod Q · T to form C(4). Let
every userUi, for i ≥ 1, adopt the above public key encryption scheme, andUi’s
key pair be denoted as (PKi, SKi). The algorithms Aut is identical to that in the
original cryptosystem, but the Com algorithm is defined as follows.
– Com(Ci,C j,Ti, j): This algorithm outputs 1 if xi = x j or 0 otherwise, where
xi =
eˆ(C(4)
i
, g
ri, j
2
)
eˆ(C(2)
i
, g
yiri, j
2
)
=
eˆ(g
viyi
1
· H3((UH(Mi))2
L
mod Q · T)), g
ri, j
2
)
eˆ(g
vi
1
, g
yiri, j
2
)
= eˆ(H3((UH(Mi))2
L
mod Q · T)), g2)
ri, j
x j =
eˆ(C(4)
j
, g
ri, j
2
)
eˆ(C(2)
j
, g
y jri, j
2 )
=
eˆ(g
v jy j
1
· H3((UH(M j))2
L
mod Q · T)), g
ri, j
2
)
eˆ(g
v j
1
, g
y jri, j
2
)
= eˆ(H3((UH(M j))2
L
mod Q · T)), g2)
ri, j
As to this enhanced cryptosystem, the existing properties still hold, and
their security proofs remain exactly the same. If a proxy is givenUt’s ciphertext
Enc(M,PKt) and token Ti,t, then it can obtain H3((UH(M))2
L
mod Q · T). To test
any M′, the most efficient approach for the proxy is to compute (UH(M′))2L
mod Q · T and perform a comparison based on its hash value. Since every test
will cost Lmultiplications, then by setting an appropriate L the offline message
recovery attack will be made computationally very expensive. Suppose that the
size of the actual message space is not very small, this approach will deter the
attack to some extent.
It is worth noting that, in this enhanced cryptosystem, the encryptor needs
to perform L multiplications to mask the message in the encryption. This may
be a computational bottleneck for some application scenarios. How to overcome
this drawback while still mitigating the attack is an interesting future work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new formulation for PKEET, namely FG-
PKEET. Compared with the formulation in [20], we have introduced a fine-
grained authorizationmechanism for users to specifywho can perform equality
test between their ciphertexts and successfullymitigate the possible drawbacks.
We believe that the new formulation suits theoretical and practical security
requirements better, and will be an important building block in designing pri-
vacy protection solutions supporting operations on encrypted data. Beyond this
work, there aremany interesting future researchdirections. One is to investigate
the security implications when the user set and the proxy set overlap in the case
of FG-PKEET. Our feeling is that in that case OW-CCA is the strongest security
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we can achieve. Another line of research is to investigate the practical coun-
termeasures against offline message recovery attacks in the extreme situation,
when the message space is polynomial size or the min-entropy of the message
distribution is much lower than the security parameter.
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